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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code §
78-2-2(3)(j). This matter was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code § 78-2-2(4)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue: Whether the court erred when granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment
dismissing Mr. Briggs' breach of contract action, by concluding a binding contract to
settle Mr. Briggs' claims existed, when there are disputed issues of fact and law about
whether there was an unconditional acceptance to Mr. Briggs' offer or whether
Defendants response was a counter-offer.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, \ 2 (Record, at 188-189).
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Issue: Whether the District Court improperly weighed evidence and made findings of fact
on disputed issues regarding Plaintiffs offer and Defendants' response to that offer.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 188-196).

Issue: Whether the Court's conclusion of law finding Mr. Briggs' other causes of action
to be without merit, was erroneous.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (Record, at 3450).

Issue: Whether the District Court erred in finding that Mr. Briggs offer was not made
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under duress.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 188-196).

Issue: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs complaint because of a
settlement agreement when Defendants were in breach of the ostensible settlement
agreement, and therefore not in a position to seek enforcement against Mr. Briggs.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; (Record, at 188-196; see ^ 17; Record, at 171 specificially).

Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, awarding
attorney's fees when disputed material facts precluded summary judgment and where
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Defendants admitted that Plaintiff had raised material disputed facts.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.)? Plaintiffs motion to
summarily deny Defendants motion for summary judgment; showing Defendants'
admission that Plaintiff had raised material disputes (Record, at 798-801).

Issue: Whether the Distirct Court erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to statute
(Utah Code § 78-27-56) when the undisputed facts do not fit that statute.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.).

Issue: Whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees "in the interest of

9

justice" without explaining how any exception to the American Rule fit this case and
where the undisputed facts do not support such an award.
Standard of Review: For reviewing the granting of summary judgment: review for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Alder v.
Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115.
Preserved for appeal: Plaintiffs memorandum opposing Defendants' motion for summary
judgment; showing disputed facts (Record, at 533 et seq.).

DETERMINITIVE LAW
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
Utah Code § 13-11-1 et seq (Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act)
Utah Code § 78-27-56 (Attorney's Fees)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of case:
This case is for damages for breach of contract, consumer protection violations, and
fraud. Defendants counterclaimed for attorney's fees.

Course of proceedings:
1.

Mr. Briggs filed this case on November 29, 1999.

2.

Defendants answered on March 20, 2000.
10

3.

Mr. Briggs filed an Amended Complaint on September 26, 2000.

4.

Defendants answered and counterclaimed on November 29, 2000.

5.

Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. (Defendants: March 15, 2001;

Plaintiff: March 26, 2001).
6.

The Court heard Mr. Briggs' and Defendants' motions for summary judgment on

May 22, 2001.
7.

On June 11, 2001 the Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint in a signed minute

entry, but did not rule on Defendants' counterclaim.
8.

Defendant filed, and the Court signed, a "Final Judgment Dismissing Mr. Briggs'

Complaint." July 3, 2001.
9.

Mr. Briggs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found the order was not final

and dismissed the appeal without prejudice. Briggs v. Valley Spas, Inc., 2001 UT App
410.
10.

Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on January 30, 2003.

11.

The District Court heard argument on Defendants' second motion for summary

judgment ("Second MSJ"), the District Court also heard argument on Defendants' motion
for rule 11 sanctions, which it denied. That motion is not part of this appeal.
12.

The District Court granted Defendants' Second MSJ in a signed minute entry on

July 23, 2003.
13.

Mr. Briggs timely appealed on September 22, 2003.
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Disposition at trial court:
The Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint in Defendants' first motion for summary
judgment ("First MSJ") and granted Defendants' counterclaim in Defendants' Second
MSJ.

Relevant facts:
1. Between September 17, 1993 and September 16, 1995 Mr. Briggs paid Defendants
$8,939.19, constituting full payment (Record, at 183) at Defendants' Utah State
Fair booth for a particular model of spa and gazebo (Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 1fl[ 1-3; Record, at 172-3) having been
told by Defendants they could produce his fully-paid-for spa and gazebo whenever
Mr. Briggs was ready to take delivery (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, ^f 4; Record, at
209).
2. At some point, Defendants' business stopped carrying the manufacturer who made
Mr. Briggs' spa and gazebo (Affidavit of Defendant Lowell Brown, *[j 5; Record, at
303).
3. Sometime in 1999, Mr. Briggs became aware that Defendants' were unable to
honor his contract because Defendants no longer carried Cal Spas products.
(Affidavit of Larry Briggs, ^ 5; Record, at 209 cf Affidavit of Defendant Lowell
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Brown, f 2 Record, 336 "...Valley Spas dealer relationship with Cal Spas has been
terminated...).
4. Mr. Briggs demanded a refund (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, ^ 6; Record, at 209).
5. Defendants refused (Affidavit of Lowell Brown, ^ 4; Record, at 248-9 cf Affidavit
of Larry Briggs, ^f 8, 209) claiming Mr. Briggs had bought a "store credit" not a
particular hot tub and gazebo (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 9, 209 c/Letter to
Plaintiff from Defendants, dated November 11, 1999 ("Brown Response");
Record, at 185: "Current in store creditof [sic]..." c/Affidavit of Defendant
Lowell Brown, \ 8, Record, at 337 "I never told plaintiff his only right consisted of
a 'store credit'...").
6. On November 9, 1999, after much negotiation, Mr. Briggs sent Defendants a letter
offering to settle his claim (Letter from Plaintiff to Defendants dated November 9,
1999 ("Briggs Offer"); Record, at 184). This letter offered to accept the gazebo as
described in his purchase contract, at the then-current higher price, and taking a
refund on the difference. The letter further said that this matter had to be "totally
resolved" by November 20th 1999 or Mr. Briggs would file suit Id.
7. Defendants response, contained in Brown Response, countered by proposing to
deliver a gazebo different from the one Mr. Briggs demanded in Briggs Offer, and
agreeing to refund the balance to Mr. Briggs by November 18, 1999 (Brown
Response; Record, at 185)
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8. Brown Response further required that Mr. Briggs agree with and sign their selfstyled "proposal" before receiving his refund (Brown Response; Record at 185: "If
you are in agreement with letter please acknowledge.... Valley Spa will issue a
check at the same time you provide us with agreement with this letter." and
"Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal.").
9. Mr. Briggs considered this a counter-offer and never agreed to it (Affidavit of
Larry Briggs, ^ 19; Record, at 109).
10. On November 20, 1999, the date Mr. Briggs' letter had set for performance (Briggs
Offer; Record, at 184), and two days after the Brown Response promised to deliver
the refund (Brown Response; Record, at 185), Defendants had not delivered the
gazebo (Affidavit of Lowell Brown, ^ 10; Record, at 275-276), nor had they
tendered the refund (Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 15; Record, at 209).
11. Mr. Briggs waited until November 29, 1999 and, having received nothing from
Defendants, filed the suit now at issue seeking to enforce his sales contract
(Complaint bearing Third District Court file stamp date November 29, 1999,
Record, at 1).

Summary of argument:
The District Court erred on several grounds in granting Defendants' first and second
motions for summary judgment.

14

Defendant's first motion for summary judgment:
The District Court dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint, ruling that a) the November 9,
1999 letter from Plaintiff to Defendant (Briggs Offer) and the November 11, 1999
letter from Defendant to Mr. Briggs (Brown Response) constituted a valid, binding
offer and unconditional acceptance to settle Mr. Briggs' claims, and b) "Mr.
Briggs' [other] claims do not have merit."
The District Court erred because:
1. The Brown Response is not an unconditional acceptance; it is a
counterproposal, which operated to reject the Briggs Offer.
2. The Court improperly weighed evidence and made findings of fact on
disputed issues.
3. The ostensible settlement agreement would not totally extinguish Mr.
Briggs' rights.
4. The Court's ruling on Mr. Briggs' other causes of action is sparse and
lacks conclusions and a recitation of the facts supporting those
conclusions, and is itself an incorrect conclusion of law.
5. The Briggs Offer was made under duress after Defendants' unlawful
actions, and was therefore void or voidable.
6. Defendants themselves breached the ostensible settlement agreement,
and therefore they were not in a position to seek enforcement against
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Mr. Briggs.
Defendants' second motion for summary judgment:
The District Court granted attorney's fees in the second motion for summary
judgment. This decision was erroneous because:
1. Disputed material facts precluded summary judgment.
2. The Court wrongly allowed attorney's fees pursuant to statute (Utah Code §
78-27-56) when the facts do not fit that statute.
3. The Court awarded attorney's fees "in the interest of justice" without
explaining how any exception to the American Rule fit this case.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Briggs was forced to sue Defendants for breach of contract (and other
legal claims) because Defendants refused to deliver the gazebo and spa as contracted for,
and for which Mr. Briggs had fully paid some four years earlier, and refused to refund the
money to Mr. Briggs. When Mr. Briggs attempted to resolve the matter with the
Defendants by proposing the Briggs Offer, the Defendants rejected the offer and pressed
their own counter-offer. Mr. Briggs never accepted the counter-offer. The rest of the
litigation flows from the Defendants' dogged refusal to make good on the sale of the
gazebo and spa or to refund the money paid.
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The Defendants filed their first motion for summary judgment (hereafter "First MS J")
against Mr. Briggs1 complaint. The District Court granted the First MS J and thereby cut
off Briggs' right to a trial on the merits when the facts and law demanded otherwise.
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution "assures access to the courts for the
protection of rights and the redress of wrongs; therefore, summary judgment, which
denies the opportunity of trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is
no reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail." Utah State University of
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 nl4, (Utah 1982).
In granting Defendants' First MS J the District Court recited some of the facts of the
case, (improperly) weighed some disputed facts, and expressly found that "[the Briggs
Offer] constitutes an offer. [The Brown Response] is an unconditional acceptance of Mr.
Briggs' offer." (Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6); see also Record, at 866 (also
Addendum, at tab 7), where the District Court implicitly repeated this finding.) The Court
then dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint without further explanation (Record, at 375 (also
Addendum, at tab 6)).
I. Contrary to the District Court's Finding, The Ostensible Settlement Agreement
Did Not Constitute an Accord and Satisfaction.
The District Court erroneously found that the Briggs Offer and Brown Response
constituted, as a matter of law, an accord and satisfaction (without actually calling it that).
17

"An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree that a certain
performance offered in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon will
discharge the obligation created under the original agreement." Petersen v. Petersen, 709
P.2d 372, 377 (Utah 1985).
It is undisputed that Mr. Briggs and Defendants had a contract obligating Defendants
to deliver a particular model spa and gazebo for an agreed price - a price that Mr. Briggs
had already paid more than four years before bringing this action. (Sales Agreement,
Record, at 55 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). As a defense to Mr. Briggs' breach of contract
cause of action, Defendants alleged that the parties had entered into a new agreement that
called for the Defendants to perform in a manner different from the original contract.
(Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, f 1 (under Counterclaim
heading), Record, at 65). It was this ostensible agreement that the District Court
concluded was valid and binding. (Minute Entry dated June 11, 2001 ("First ME");
Record, at 375 (also addendum, at tab 6)).
The District Court erred in this finding, however, because the ostensible agreement
did not fulfill the elements of an accord and satisfaction. "The elements essential to
contracts generally must be present in an accord and satisfaction, including an offer and
acceptance and a meeting of the minds." Cove View Excavating and Const. Co. v. Flynn,
758 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1988). Specifically, Defendants did not unconditionally
accept the Briggs Offer. Instead, the Brown Response offered different terms and thereby
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rejected Mr. Briggs' offer. (Brown Response; Record, at 185 (also addendum, at tab 3))
"An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the
offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer." Cal
Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995) (emphasis
added). In this case, the Defendants never assented to "all material terms presented" in the
Briggs Offer.
The Briggs Offer offered to accept the "Gazebo as described in my contract." (Briggs
Offer; Record, at 184 (also Addendum, at tab 2)). That original contract (the final sales
contract) specified a "grey metal" color "Omni Lux[ury]" gazebo with outside dimensions
of 16' 7" x 12' 7". (Sales Agreement; Record, at 183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). The
Briggs Offer further demanded that Defendants perform by November 20, 1999 (Briggs
Offer; Record, at 184) The Briggs Offer thus called for delivery of the specified gazebo
and refund of money by November 20, 1999 (Briggs Offer; Record, at 184 (also
Addendum, at tab 2)); the Brown Response did not accept those terms of the Briggs offer.
"An acceptance must be clear, positive and unambiguous.[citation omitted] ... This
requirement is often treated as identical with the requirement dealt with in the following
sections that an acceptance must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of the offer, and
such changes or qualifications undoubtedly prevent an acceptance from being positive
and unequivocal." R.J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah 1952)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
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By changing the terms of the offer, the Brown Response did not accept the Briggs
Offer but instead counter-offered by offering to deliver an "Omni Luxury 12x16 green
metal roof gazebo. (Brown Response; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3)). The
Brown Response also stated: "This is the 1999 version of the product you purchased..."
Id. Finally, the Brown Response goes on to require Mr. Briggs to agree with Defendants'
self-styled "proposal," i.e. this counter-offer, before he could get his refund. Id.
The Brown Response thus offered to deliver a gazebo differing in color, model year,
and size from the gazebo specified in the original contract and in the Briggs Offer.
Furthermore, the Brown Response required Mr. Briggs to assent to their self-styled
proposal.
"An offeree's proposal of different terms from those of the offer constitutes a
counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original offeror accepts it
unconditionally" Cal Wadsworth, at 1378 (emphasis added).
The Brown Response makes clear that Defendants asked Briggs to assent to their offer
(Brown Response, Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3)). "The apparent mutual
assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from the
language employed by them, and the law imputes to a person an intention
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of its words and acts." Allen v. Bissinger &
Co., 219 P. 539, 541 (Utah 1923) (emphasis added)
Defendants' words required Mr. Briggs to expressly agree with the counter-offer: "If
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you are in agreement with this letter please acknowledge by signing below where
provided. Valley Spa will issue a check at the same time you provide us with agreement
with this letter, ^f Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal" (Brown
Response; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at tab 3); emphasis added). The reasonable
meaning of Brown Response's words is that Defendants sought Mr. Briggs' "agreement"
to Defendants' "proposal," The plain meaning of the Brown Response's words is that of
an offer; not an "unconditional acceptance." Furthermore, the reasonable implication of
Brown Response's words is that Defendants knew that their letter was an offer, not an
acceptance 1.
Mr. Briggs never accepted the Brown Response's counter-offer. (Affidavit of Larry
Briggs dated March 17, 2001,119; Record, at 210 (also Addendum, at tab 4)). Therefore,
no contract of any sort arose from the Brown Response. Accordingly, no accord and
satisfaction existed as a result of either the Briggs Offer or the Brown Response.

II. The District Court Improperly Made Findings of Facts When Deciding the
First Summary Judgment.
The District Court found that the Briggs Offer and the Brown Response created an

1 Furthermore, the original Answer filed March 20, 2000
does not mention the ostensible settlement agreement
(Record, at 23-26) It is only in Defendants' Answer to
Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, after Defendants'
switched counsel, that the issue is raised; one year after
Plaintiff filed this suit. (Record, at 51-67) .
21

accord and satisfaction. (First ME; Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6)). To make
this finding, the District Court had to first find that the Defendants accepted the Briggs
Offer. The Court's minute entry expressly says it found the Brown Response to be an
"unconditional acceptance." (First ME; Record, at 375) "A trial court's finding about
whether a party accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a finding of fact." Cal Wadsworth,
1378 (emphasis added). The District Court's finding was wholly improper on summary
judgment because "summary judgment, by definition, does not resolve factual issues."
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App. 1992) (cert,
denied) (citations omitted).
As explained above, the Brown Response was ineffective as an unconditional
acceptance, so there was no accord and satisfaction. Likewise, there is no evidence that
Mr. Briggs ever accepted the terms of the Brown Response, i.e. Mr. Briggs never
expressly assented to the Brown Response as required by the express terms of that
counter-offer. In fact, Mr. Briggs testifies in an affidavit saying: "I never accepted Lowell
Brown's offer-proposal...." (March 17, 2001 Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f 19, Record, at
210 (also addendum, at tab 4))
To prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants had to offer
undisputed facts showing every element of their defense. "The party alleging accord and
satisfaction has the burden of proving that there has been a definite meeting of the minds
on a new and substitute contract." United American Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat. Bank,
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641 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1982). The Brown Response (and Defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on the Brown Response) utterly lacked the undisputed facts to
show that there was a "definite meeting of the minds." Thus, the District Court erred by
granting summary judgment where material facts were in dispute.
The appellate courts review "the trial court's legal conclusions supporting the grant of
summary judgment for correctness, according them no particular deference," and look "at
the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing
party." Campbell, 840 P.2d at 137. Mr. Briggs pleaded a breach of contract claim arising
from Defendants' failure to perform on the original gazebo contract. {See Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand, Record, at 34-50). The undisputed facts show the existence
of the original contract (Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, \
76, Record, at 44) that Plaintiff had completed his obligation to perform (i.e. he had paid
in full) (Defendants' Second MS J,ffif1-3; Record, at 416), and Defendants' failure to
perform on it. (Record, at 274-275). Defendants have not offered undisputed proof to
establish the accord and satisfaction that they alleged. (Defendants' Answer to Amended
Complaint and Counterclaim, f 3 (under heading Affirmative Defenses), Record, at 64).
In contract claims, summary judgment is appropriate "[o]nly when contract terms are
complete, clear, and unambiguous..." Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v.
Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986). Even a cursory reading of the
Briggs Offer and the Brown Response show that the terms and conditions differ in the

23

two documents, and that Brown Response demands Mr. Briggs acceptance, so that they
did not form a "clear and unambiguous" contract.
When the facts and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Briggs, the
Brown Response itself presents disputed questions of material fact about whether it was
an unconditional acceptance of Brigg's Offer. The District Court erred in granting
summary judgment and should be reversed.

III. Contrary to the District Court's Finding, the Ostensible Settlement Agreement,
if Valid, Would Not Extinguish Mr. Briggs' Right To Relief.
The District Court erroneously ruled that Mr. Briggs had no rights under the original
sales contract, and no rights under the ostensible settlement agreement the Court ruled
enforceable. (Minute Entry dated July 23, 2003 ("Second ME55); Record, at 867 (also
addendum, at tab 7)). Mr. Briggs has maintained that no valid settlement existed, but the
District Court erred and imposed an injustice by ruling that Mr. Briggs5 rights under both
the original sales contract and the ostensible agreement were extinguished. Id.
It is undisputed that Defendants failed to deliver the gazebo and the refund. The only
question is: which contract did the Defendants breach? The District Court initially held
there was a settlement agreement between the Mr. Briggs and Defendant. (First ME;
Record, at 375 (also addendum, at tab 6)). The Defendants failed to deliver the gazebo,
even under the ostensible settlement agreement. (Affidavit of Lowell Brown dated April
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[no day], 2001, ^f 13; Record, at 338 (also addendum, at tab 5)). That fact positioned Mr.
Briggs to exercise the option of suing for breach of the ostensible settlement agreement,
or suing for breach of the underlying claim. "[A] party to the [settlement] agreement
aggrieved by an alleged breach thereof by the other party has the option of seeking to
enforce the settlement agreement, or regarding the agreement as rescinded and moving
against the other party on the underlying claim." L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const.
Co., Inc., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980).
Because Mr. Briggs had the option of suing under either the original contract or the
ostensible settlement agreement, the District Court erred by granting summary judgment
against Mr. Briggs on both contracts at the same time. "Where a motion for summary
judgment is clearly based upon one or the other theory of recovery, (enforcement or
rescission), an election may be deemed to have been made, since the two theories must be
regarded as separate and distinct claims, and summary judgment is granted only as to
one of the individual claims, rather than as to the case as a whole" Id. (emphasis
added, footnote omitted).
The District Court first ruled and dismissed Mr. Briggs' complaint, but the Court's
ruling was silent on Mr. Briggs' remaining rights. (First ME; Record, at 372-375 (also
addendum, at tab 6)). Mr. Briggs, assuming that he could not pursue an action on the
original contract, waited for Defendants to perform under the "settlement agreement"
Defendants had urged the Court to find. After two more years with no performance, Mr.
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Briggs filed a motion to revive the underlying action based on Defendants'
nonperformance. (Motion to Revive Underlying Action; Record, at 685). The District
Court denied this motion, stating: "Again, the Court confirms its earlier ruling and finds
that Mr. Briggs breached the Settlement Agreement. Furthermore, that breach ultimately
relieved Defendants of any duty they had to perform under the Agreement." (Second ME;
Record, at 867 (also addendum, at tab 7)).
This ruling means that Mr. Briggs has no rights under the original claim and none
under the ostensible settlement agreement—he is stripped naked at the bar of justice.
For their part, Defendants expressly elected to pursue the ostensible settlement
agreement. "Defendants respectfully submit that in the circumstances of this case, the
parties' Settlement Agreement should be summarily enforced..." (First MS J; Record, at
177-8) Therefore, the District Court's ruling that Mr. Briggs had no claim under either the
original contract or the "settlement agreement" is erroneous and an affront to justice. The
Court's ruling must be reversed.

IV. The District Court Improperly Granted Defendants' First Motion for
Summary Judgment on Other Claims
The District Court erred in granting Defendants' First MS J when it tersely ruled
"Mr. Briggs' claims of duress, deceptive layaway plans, and violations of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act do not have merit." (First ME; Record, at 375 (also
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addendum, at tab 6)).
Mr. Briggs had a constitutional and common law right to a trial unless the
undisputed facts and law clearly support summary judgment. See Utah State University,
646 P.2d 715 n.14. The District Court's grant of summary judgment cut off Briggs1 right
to a trial on the merits when the facts and law demanded otherwise.
"The courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about
whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be
resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." Colman v. Utah
State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); see also Controlled Receivables, Inc. v.
Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966)( "A motion for summary judgment is a harsh
measure, and for this reason plaintiffs' contentions must be considered in a light most to
his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go to trial; and only if
when the whole matter is so viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery,
should the motion be granted.")
Plaintiff Mr. Briggs Properly Pleaded A Consumer Sales Practices Act
Violation Claim.
Defendants committed at least 3 violations of Utah and Federal consumer protection
laws:
1. Mr. Briggs was not properly notified of his 3-day right to rescind (Sales
Agreement; Record, at 182 (also addendum, at tab 1)). Defendants violated 16
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CFR § 429 (see addendum, at tab 14), which requires specific notice of the right to
rescind on all sales over $25 made at "the buyer's residence or at facilities rented
on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel or motel rooms, convention
centers, fairgrounds..." 16 CFR § 429.0(a). The rule is stated in 16 CFR § 429.1
(see addendum, at tab 14), the pertinent portions read:
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and
deceptive act or practice for any seller to:
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of any
contract pertaining to such sale at the time of its execution, which is in the
same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally used in the oral sales
presentation and which shows the date of the transaction and contains the
name and address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space
reserved in the contract for the signature of the buyer or on the front page of
the receipt if a contract is not used and in bold face type of a minimum size
of 10 points, a statement in substantially the following form:
"You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of
the third business day after the date of this transaction. See the attached
notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right." ...

"(f) Misrepresent in any manner the buyer's right to cancel. "

The Utah Legislature has declared that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act,
"shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: ... (4) to make state
regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the policies of the
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection." Utah Code § 13-
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11-2 (see addendum, at tab 13). Under the Utah Act, Defendants' failure to give a
rescission notice constitutes a deceptive act or practice. Utah Code § 13-1 l-4(m)
(see addendum, at tab 13). The sale was over $25 (Sales Agreement; Record, at
183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)) and it took place at the Utah State Fairgrounds
(Amended Complaint and Jury Demand; Record, at 35-36), which is a facility
rented "on a temporary or short-term basis." 16 C.F.R. § 429.0(a) (see addendum,
at tab 14).
2. Defendants deceptively insisted that Mr. Briggs had purchased a "store
credit," not a spa and gazebo (Brown Offer; Record, at 185 (also Addendum, at
tab 3) c/Sales Agreement; Record, at 183 (also Addendum, at tab 1)). Defendants'
statement violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code § 13-114(1) (see Addendum, at tab 13) because the statement indicated that Mr. Briggs
contract was not for a spa and gazebo, but rather a store credit.
3. Defendants refused to give Mr. Briggs a refund when they could not deliver
the paid for merchandise (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001, ^f 8;
Record, at 209). Defendants' refusal violated the Utah Consumer Sales Practices
Act, Utah Code § 13-11-1 et seq. generally and § 13-11-4(1) (see Addendum, at tab
13)requiring a refund where supplier unable to deliver within 30 days).

The District Court's Ruling Leaves Mr. Briggs unable to fully address the
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merits because of its lack of grounds
The District Court gave no reasons why it ruled Mr. Briggs' additional claims were
without merit. The District Court's failure to explain its ruling violated the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) which requires written conclusions of fact and law: "The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on
more than one ground." The District Court's failure also now prevents Mr. Briggs from
addressing its ruling on the merits. This Court should reverse the District Court's ruling
and remand for proper consideration of the merits of all of Mr. Briggs' causes of action.

V. The Briggs Offer was void or voidable because it was made under duress
The District Court erred when it found the Briggs Offer a valid offer (First ME,
Record, at 375 (also Addendum, at tab 6)). Mr. Briggs was under duress when he made
the offer, duress caused by Defendants' wrongful behavior, and leaving Mr. Briggs with
no reasonable alternative.
Mr. Briggs had paid the full amount (almost $9,000) on his contract over four years
earlier. Defendants insisted that they would not honor their end of the contract.
Defendants insisted that the only thing Mr. Briggs could do with his contract was work
some new bargain. The resulting Briggs Offer was very much to Defendants favor. Mr.
Briggs had paid for one of Defendants' best spas and gazebos but was forced, by
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Defendants' unlawful acts, to consider accepting far less than he had bargained and paid
for (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001; Record, at 209 (also Addendum, at
tab 4)). Defendants' deceptive acts and false claims (see discussion supra on the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act violations) forced Mr. Briggs to bargain against himself
when the law, unbeknownst to him, was on his side.
Defendants, under a statutory obligation to obey the law, are seeking to benefit
because of their violation of those laws. Had Mr. Briggs known of his rights, i.e. if
Defendants had obeyed the law, Mr. Briggs never would have bargained against his best
interests (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001, ^ 33; Record, at 210 (also
Addendum, at tab 4)).
Mr. Briggs asks this Court to rule that the Briggs Offer was void or voidable by reason
of being made under duress, i.e. threatening to convert his contract for a spa and gazebo
(as he had bargained for) into a virtually unusable store credit, by failing to give him
required notice of his rights to rescission, and by falsely telling him he could not get a
refund.
Duress requires two elements: 1) an improper threat that 2) leaves the other party with
no reasonable alternative, see Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993).
"[A]n improper threat may be found when (i) the resulting exchange is no1 on fair
terms, and (ii) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent is
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat." Andreini v.
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Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah 1993).
Clearly, Mr. Briggs was getting less than he had originally bargained for, and paid for.
Defendants had had his money for more than four years without delivering on their
obligation, then they threatened to illegally convert his paid-for spa and gazebo into a
virtually unusable "store credit." Because of Defendants' continuing violations of
consumer protection law, Larry Briggs was turned from an arm's length negotiator to a
beggar on his knees, seeking any scrap Defendants would deign to offer.
"[A] contract may be voided [i]f a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative."
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993). Mr. Briggs' alternatives were to
bargain to pay a much higher price for the gazebo he already paid, and had a contract for,
forget about the spa, and get a small refund, or get nothing.
Besides Defendants' violations of consumer protection laws discussed supra,
Defendants' acts also violated their obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The District
Court allowed a malefactor to benefit from his malfeasance by obligating Mr. Briggs to
an offer made by wrongful coercion. This should not stand and the District Court's ruling
should be reversed.

VI. The District Court could not properly enforce the ostensible settlement
agreement because the Defendants were not in compliance and had not
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performed.
Defendants argued that there was a settlement agreement and that Mr. Briggs
breached it by filing suit. (Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim,
Tf 1 (under Counterclaim heading), Record, at 65). The District Court erred in accepting
this argument, not only because there was no acceptance, as argued supra, but Defendants
were themselves not in compliance with their argued-for agreement.
"Neither party to an agreement can be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to
a judgment for damages or a decree for specific performance) until the other party has
tendered his own performance." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp,.M6 P.2d 1238, 1243
(Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Defendants had told the district Court that they had performed on the
ostensible agreement (Record, at 176; First MS J, heading II, "Defendants have performed
their side of the settlement agreement"), Defendants later admitted they have not
performed saying "it would be foolhardy for Defendants to perform..." (Record, at 693).
The District Court erred when it enforced the ostensible agreement against one
party while the other party was in default. This ruling should be reversed.

VII. The District Court erred in granting Defendants5 Second MSJ, granting
attorney's fees.
Mr. Briggs filed his opposition to Defendants' Second MSJ (which asserted 87 so-
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called undisputed material facts) and properly disputed a substantial number of
allegations (Record, at 572 et seq) that Defendant certified to the Court (pursuant to Rule
11(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) as "UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS." (Second
MSJ; Record, at 417). Because there were disputes over "facts" that Defendants conceded
were "material," the District Court erred in granting summary judgment.
ff

[I]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other

side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. ... if there is any dispute as to any
issue, material to the settlement of the controversy, the summary judgment should not be
granted." HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) emphasis added);
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) (same rule, same
language).
In his memorandum opposing Defendants' Second MSJ, Mr. Briggs disputedfflf4-6,
8, 12, 15, 17-19, 22-23, 25-26, 28-31, 33, 35, 38, 40-43, 48-49, 51, 53-54, 62, 65, 69, 78
of Defendants' Second MSJ (Memorandum in Opposition to Second MSJ; Record, at 533
et seq.). For example: ^f 5 of Defendants' Second MSJ alleges as an undisputed material
fact the following: "On November 11, 1999 Defendants unconditionally accepted Mr.
Briggs' settlement offer." (Second MSJ; Record, at 418). Mr. Briggs disputes this with
eight pages of discussion, citing to affidavits 26 times (Memorandum in Opposition to
Second MSJ; Record, at 533-540). Whether the Defendants accepted the Briggs Offer is a
fact that is absolutely necessary to deciding whether there was any settlement agreement,
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which is a necessary element to proving lack of merit. The "fact" of acceptance was
controverted; it was error for the District Court to weigh this highly-contested "fact" and
grant summary judgment.
Defendants, in response to Mr. Briggs' challenge to their Second MS J, filed a motion
for Rule 11 sanctions (Record, at 699 et seq.). (The District Court rightly denied this
motion (Second ME; Record, at 867 (Affidavit of Larry Briggs dated March 17, 2001;
Record, at 209 (also Addendum, at tab 7))). In Defendants' reply memorandum in support
of their Rule 11 motion Defendants conceded Mr. Briggs had raised disputes of
material facts: "Defendants challenge only those falsehoods which are relevant to
[Defendants'] Counterclaim. Mr. Briggs made these false representations in an attempt to
raise material disputes of fact precluding summary judgment on the Counterclaim. The
materiality of each misrepresentation is discussed below." (Record, at 747; emphasis in
original).
Defendants, having conceded that the disputes were material, did not ask the Court to
withdraw their Second MS J even though Utah law does not allow summary judgment
where material facts are in dispute. Mr. Briggs, therefore, moved the Court to summarily
dismiss Second MS J (Record, at 798) on grounds that the dispositive issue was settled.
In Defendants' memorandum opposing Mr. Briggs' summary motion (Record, at 825)
the argument reaches the absurd: "Any residual disputes of fact are not 'material' within
the meaning of Rule 56..." (Record, at 826, emphasis in original). What Defendants now
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dismiss as "residual disputes of fact" (having previously called them "material" (Record,
at 747; emphasis in original)) in this case were not just material, they were critical. The
District Court wrongly granted summary judgment where the movant admitted disputes of
material facts ("The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see
Addendum, at tab 12)).
The District Court's granting of summary judgment should, therefore be reversed.

VIII. The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to statute
The District Court erroneously granted Defendants' Second MS J granting attorney's
fees under Utah Code Section 78-27-56 (see Addendum, at tab 11). The District Court's
ruling failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and its decision
was erroneous as a matter of law.
Section 78-27-56 states in pertinent part:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith...
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This statute does not broadly authorize a court to award attorneys fees at the court's
discretion or because a party prevails in a lawsuit. "Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code is
narrowly drawn and not meant to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits. To
safeguard against an overly broad application, a prevailing party must demonstrate two
distinct elements before a court may award attorney fees; namely, that the claim is (1)
without merit, and (2) not brought or asserted in good faith." In re Discipline of
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, \ 46 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court earlier declared: "Under the plain language of this statute,
attorney fees are appropriately awarded only if the trial court determines that three
requirements are met: (1) the party seeking fees prevailed; (2) the claim or defense
asserted by the opposing party was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in
bad faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must make specific
findings, see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991)
(emphasis added) ("Specific findings further the ends of justice by allowing appeals
courts to better review the trial court's award."). "Absent specific findings, the basis of the
award cannot be determined." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997).
The District Court's ruling, set forth in its signed minute entry of July 23, 2003, states:
"Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56 ... the Court awards attorney's fees
as a result of Mr. Briggs' breach." (Second ME; Record, at 866 (also Addendum, at tab
7)). The Court's ruling does not make any of the findings required by law. Chipman, 934
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P.2d at 1161. As a matter of law, the ruling is thus insufficient to support an award of
attorneys' fees.
What is worse, the District Court's terse and uninformative ruling raised the issue of
motive or bias. At oral argument on July 22, 2003, Defendants' counsel stated:
Now Mr. Briggs has made it clear he's going to appeal and Your Honor, I would
suggest - and I'm going to be a little more practical and explicit than I'd usually be in
a court and if I'm speaking (inaudible) I ask for the Judge's forgiveness, if the Judge
splits the baby this litigation will continue because Mr. Briggs will appeal and we'll
keep rolling up fees. If the Judge awards a substantial attorney's fee award that will
give us room to negotiate and compromise and hopefully put a stake through the heart
of this thing.
(Transcript of July 22, 2003 Oral Argument; Record, at 893, page 25, lines 9-17).
This revealing statement shows Defendants' counsel asking the Court to join on his
side and thwart Mr. Briggs' right to appeal. "The right to an appeal is a valuable and
constitutional right and ought not to be denied except where it is clear the right has been
lost or abandoned." Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1947). Because of
the District Court's terse ruling, and because the Court did not disdain this line of
argument from counsel, Mr. Briggs has no way of knowing if the Court relied on this
argument in making its award of substantial attorney's fees.
Another instance of undue and unfair influence occurred after that hearing. In its
signed minute entry of July 23, 2003, the District Court asked Defendants to "prepare an
order consistent with this Minute Entry." (Record, at 867 (also Addendum, at tab 7)).
Defendants sneaked an exclamation of bad faith and meritlessness into their order, trying
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to salvage the Court's ruling. The proposed order thus recited: "[F]or the reasons set forth
in the Court's Minute Entry dated July 23, 2003, as well as the grounds set forth in
defendants9 memoranda, Mr. Briggs' claims are without merit, and were not asserted in
goodfaith" (Record, at 885 (also Addendum, at tab 10); emphasis added). Defendants
added language to the District Court's order - "the grounds set forth in defendants'
memoranda" - that included by reference all of Defendants' arguments as though the
District Court had accepted and agreed with them all.
Mr. Briggs filed an objection to Defendants' bootstrapping of grounds into the order.
(Record, at 875-876 (also Addendum, at tab 8)). In response to Mr. Briggs' objection,
Defendants' counsel, Steven E. McCowin, sent an ex-parte letter to Judge Henriod
explaining why he felt it necessary to improve upon the Court's ruling. (Letter from
Defendants' counsel to Judge Henriod dated August 19, 2003; Record, at 883 (also
Addendum, at tab 9)). That ex-parte letter sought to cause the court to modify its order
without briefing or a hearing on the merits, without even being on the record. The first
paragraph of the ex-parte letter stated:
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 must include a finding of
fact that the party lacked good faith, and a conclusion of law that the action was
without merit. Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932.939 n.3 (Utah 1998). To
satisfy this requirement, Defendants included the following language in the draft Final
Judgment: "Mr. Briggs' claims were without merit and were not asserted in good
faith."
(Letter from Defendants' counsel to Judge Henriod dated August 19, 2003; Record, at
883 (also Addendum, at tab 9)).
The Court impliedly refused Mr. Briggs' objection and acquiesced to Defendants'
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manipulation of the ruling when the Court signed the Order as prepared by Defendants.
(Final Judgment; Record, at 884 et seq (also Addendum, at tab 10))
Notwithstanding Defendants' liberties with the District Court's ruling, the ruling is
still flawed on the merits. The law requires such a ruling to show why Mr. Briggs' case is
frivolous. "[T]here [must] be substantial evidence that the claim was lacking basis in
either law or fact and therefore frivolous..." Cady v. Johnson, 61 \ P.2d 149, 152 (Utah
1983). The Court's minute entry (Second ME; Record, at 865 (also Addendum, at tab 7))
and the Final Judgment (Record, at 884 (also Addendum, at tab 10)) lack any foundation
for a conclusion that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous. No recitation of the
"substantial evidence" that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous appears in the District
Court's decision.
In addition to concluding the Mr. Briggs' case was frivolous, the District Court had to
make a finding of fact on the requirement that the action was not brought or asserted in
good faith. See In re Discipline ofSonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^f 46 (second element).
"[T]he issue of bad faith is a question of fact to be ascertained by the finder of fact."
Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997); see also Baldwin v.
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199 (Utah 1993) ("For purposes of section 78-27-56, we found
the terms 'lack of good faith' and 'bad faith' to be synonymous.")
To determine whether a party acted in "bad faith" requires finding that party's
subjective evil intent. "Thus, it does not follow that simply because [a party] had no legal
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foundation to bring the action that it was also acting in bad faith. Rather, a finding of bad
faith turns on a factual determination of a partyfs subjective intent." In re Discipline
of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 49 (emphasis added); see also Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d
149, 152 (Utah 1983) (even "pursuing a meritless claim ... does not rise to lack of good
faith.")
Finally, "where attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary judgment,
the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter of law, that (1) the party is
entitled to the award and (2) the amount awarded is reasonable." Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor, 110 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989).
The undisputed facts show:
1.

Mr. Briggs paid nearly $9,000 to Defendant for a spa and gazebo (First
MSJ; Record, at 172-3 ffl 1-3)).

2.

Defendants refused to perform under that contract (Affidavit of Lowell
Brown; Record, at 274-275).

3.

Defendant promised substituted performance (Briggs Response; Record, at
185).

4.

Mr. Briggs called Cal Spas to see if Defendants had placed an order for the
gazebo they said they ordered. (March 17, 1999 Affidavit of Larry Briggs, f
16; Record, at 209).

5.

Cal Spas said Defendants had not placed an order and that they would not
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do any business with Defendants. (Id, f 17; Record, at 209).
6.

Defendant never performed substituted performance (Record, at 693).2

7.

Mr. Briggs has received nothing for his money (Record, at 693).

Viewing these facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party cannot lead to a finding that Mr. Briggs acted in bad
faith. Taylor, 770 P.2d at 169 (claims that lack merit do not necessarily prove bad faith).
These same facts militate against the conclusion that Mr. Briggs5 claim was lacking in
either law or fact, or was frivolous in any respect.
The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees and should be reversed.

IX. The District Court erred by awarding attorney's fee "in the interests of justice"
The District Court also justified its award of fees on the broad claim that it was "in the
interests of justice." (Second ME; Record, at 866 (also Addendum, at tab 7)). No legal
precedent in Utah authorizes attorney's fee awards solely "in the interests of justice."
Utah courts have, from time immemorial, held to the American Rule: "The traditional
American rule, and the rule in Utah, is that attorney fees are not recoverable by a
prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract." Faust v. KAI Technologies, Inc.,
2 After an interview between Defendant Lowell Brown and
Plaintiff's counsel Greg Smith, Mr. Brown boasted that he
was going to build the gazebo he had procured for Plaintiff
and drop it off at Mr. Smith's office in the next couple of
days.(Affidavit of Gregory B. Smith f 36; Record, at 580)
Mr. Brown never did this either. (Affidavit of Gregory B.
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2000 UT 82, If 17.
Faust raised a claim for attorney's fees that was not authorized by statute or contract.
The Faust appellants argued that Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com'n, 885 P.2d 759
(Utah 1994) (awarding attorney's fees on a private attorney general doctrine), created a
new and broad right to attorney's fees. The Faust court wrote:
[I]n Stewart we recognized an exception to the traditional rule and held that an
equitable award of attorney fees was proper under the private attorney general
doctrine, which allows for an award of fees where a plaintiff successfully vindicates
an important public policy benefiting a larger population. In doing so, we stated
that we note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future
award of attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary
case.
Faust, ^[ 18 (emphasis added).

Defendants inexplicably rely on Faust (Second MS J; Record, 441), and its progenitor
Stewart (Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss; Record, at 635), in
making their claim for attorney's fees. However, Defendants failed to inform the District
Court that Faust punctures the claim they built up from Stewart.
Defendants have offered no grounds on which to hold that their defense against this
breach of contract action constituted the work of a "private attorney general" vindicating
an important public policy benefiting a larger population as, for example, a prevailing
federal civil rights plaintiff does. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey. 447 U.S. 54,
63 (1980) (civil rights plaintiffs serve as private attorneys general and thus serve the
Smith 1 4 0 ; R e c o r d ,

at

580).
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national interest). These Defendants, being sued for a breach of contract and violation of
consumer protection laws, have no colorable claim to that preferred status.
The District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees "in the interest of justice" and should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred by weighing and deciding disputed material facts and
making improper, and erroneous conclusions of law in granting Defendants' first and
second motions for summary judgment.
Wherefore, Mr. Briggs asks the Court of Appeals to reverse both summary
judgment rulings and remand to the District Court for trial on the merits.

^Tdavof.f/H

DATED this r y day of ,J, r\ '

5
Gregory B. Smith
Attorney for Mr. Briggs

44

, 2004.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
day of ^
, 2004,1 did deliver
two true and correct copy of the foregoing Opening Brief of Appellant to the following
persons, postage prepaid:
Steven E. McCowin
Attorney for Defendants
435 S. 1200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

45

Tabl

k

OVttO*

pi

Of C U / O A M A M*C**VC

V A U E Y SPAS
3985 S. Redwood Rd.
SaltUkeGty.UT.
972-1191

M . * 0 ^ * j WnyrtvC
A ofvi$o» O*
c CCM.*QI»"
f «o»n« J H O U S T * * *

*OUST*«€S « C

ALL AMEH1 CAM
3214 Washington Bivd
Ojden,UT'.
621-1953

Contract Oate: T / V f r / W
Address- W ?
__..,
Phono (Home)- ^ 3 - ^ *

690 S. main
Layton, UT.
554-8835

"C

A Orvt$JON O* C H « 0 * « A

F0HHES7 SPAS

SPA OUTLET

539 H. Main
Logan, UT.
752-5816

170 5. State St.
Orem.UT.
224-1395

LAC,-'*
fjZ.'.'b'b
UuH*7
QT
(workl- ^-s.^ '/v«i<9'
oXM^'TTi.
COLOR _ t J i t

Customer Name

MODEf fta ^ £ - v ^
<H7c g> - .<c? * S g ? "

A! TA1R PLUS X _ ACRYLIC

Deloxo Pillows and Stainless Steel Handrails
Complete U.L Approval
Plumbing Includes Installation of skimmer & Drain
C< Cal Spa Jets
" ^ Hydro Swirl Jets
A
Jumbo Jet
i l _ Cascading Neck Jet
" 2Jet Neck Blaster
± 1 Foot Jets
„

IncS
InctZ!

•U
££.
/-

^ J

Nof IncQ
N ot IncQ

'T-fiy.

.W.A<*l...'..lv$.
$.
$.
IncQ Not IncQ
$.
~
Not IncQ
$.
IncQF
$.
I n c Q Not IncQ
$.
I n c Q Not IncQ
$.
I n c Q Not IncQ
$.
I n c Q Not IncQ
i_L_Jeb
IncQ
Not
IncQ
$.
JUZ^'Pronator
IncSl Not IncQ
$..
?J.O y n U Cal Spas Skid/ack ...-i.tr...--...."..:.".?^
:
. .- N .. $.
" ^ H.P. Pump/s
"Jl*" H.P. Air Blower .jC?ir'.»^...»....-.-:r.1f.t.-.O..jLir.:x^$.
£ £ _ KW Heater
$.
50 .Sq.ft. Filter
$
Time Clock for Controlled Operation
I n d X Not IncQ
L.$,
Freeze Protection
IncQ Not IncQ
^
ABS Equipment Enclosure
Incur Not IncQ
Not
IncQ
$'
Heavy Duty 5 / 8 " Thick Redwood Cabinet
IncJ^f
$
Heavy Duty 5 / 8 * Thick Cedar Siding Cabinet
IncQ Not IncXX
Full Foam Insulation
. „ ™ . ™ . . IncJL Not
. ^ . IncQ
...^^,
y^
........ v$.
Tapered Insulated Yinyl Cover S T D ^ ^ . p ^ I n ^ ^ M o t I n c Q . X o l o r &'~^ ^
$.
Cover Hinge
*
i
b ^ 2 Not IncQ?.
$.1
Cal Spas Light with Colored Lens
I n d 3 T Not IncQ
$L/?.£&>:lr.. r '? \ \
r
T
Gazebo
Inc^
Not I n c Q ^ o d e l / ^ ' U*Y RoofStyle <>-*
^ ^L%LL^.2.^JZ
J
%
rt
S^
Bar
**^
Stools J ^ L ' S t e D
2 ~ _ Planters.
—*— **"
BayWnd..
Spa Delivery
I n c Q \ Not IncQ
7$
Gazebo Assembly
Inct3f Not IncQ
./. $
Gazebo Shade Canopy Cover
IncQ
Not IncQ
.,./... $
Crane Charges are NOTJncluded- Cal Spas Does Not Arrange or Pay for Cranes.....*;.™ $
v::

m

3&.

&£^££&J* &£.

:

MQ^^oM^i^^L

$.™*™

vo
PORTABLE SPA TWO PUMP SYSTEM N K D S 220 Volt 50 AMP breaker and 4-#6 gaujjewires «-1 i n J O T A I <; r? *> 9 5 ?
QPORTABLESPA ONE PUMP SYSTEM NfflDS. 220 Volt 40 AMP bresker and 4-#8 G ^ Q wires, ~ V * j y * ~ *'""'"'&&*•
<*V£7 '1
CAL SPAS DOES NGfT DO ANY ELECTRICAL WORK!
1 ftJtfyieoV^] K ? A LES T A X $
7^..^J '
CUSnnDMERRESP0N98LEFCR ANY BUILDING PERMITS
" tf *\ Y) ^
'
_ « D O C FEE
%„„.^~£Qi*
Chack with local building departments for all codes regarding proper haokLpi N ^ A ^ '
'' TOTAL ^ - ^ • ^ ^ ^ - ' •
A clean 110 Volt-20 amp plug- in GFQ is required by owner on all 110 Volt pbi 'W^
DOWN PAYMENT $.
Wood Skirted Spas need a Rat Solid Lavel Oecking underneath.
^
FREIGHTS
DELIVERY $
Notice to Consumer. shoJdertUrportyfiodH rwcMiory fo coIUd or briog w\ in court to

SI7f

•nfcrc* lf>« Nnrn KHK??, ony jod^tfl^oJ awortUd i W l JncJwf* court cod and a r*atorrabi« a!tcrr*/j
r»« and {frf*r«» of \JS % p^ mo. on bolonc* ow«<L

CASHWR CHECKS ONI Y
APPROVED AND ACCEPTED
3 MAAA^I
BUYERBUYER
SELlsR__£i££
DATE DESIRED. •U.I
^ 1 1

Al/UXXA
u"
«-'>l«H.

\f*(,:„i$v

«!?MT?2 " « " '

• ^grr" LSAD SOURCE

TOTAL BALANCE

.ass

Tab 2

* w r w a u c i y, i ^ W

I\L*. L-uweu Drown
ATTN: Larry Briggs
This letter is in response to you not getting back with me stating your position on whether you were
willing to except my last offer made to you to settle my dispute with Valley Spa. Again I will
reiterate my offer. On Thursday (11-4-99) over die phone I told you that I was willing to pay the
current high price of $5,995.00 + applicable tax for the Gazebo as described in my contract I also
told you that my original contract states that delivery and setup was included. However, I said that as
long as you could provide me with the setup instructions that I would be willing to set it up myself
I also stated that after paying Valley Spa for the Gazebo that there was a remaining balance on my
contract of around $2,570.00. Because this amount isn't enough to purchase a spa to my satifaction I
told you that you would have to refund this amount back to me.
You, responded by saying something to the affect of "well, with the high cost of shipping and the
price of redwood going through the roof these days, I don't know if I would be willing to do this
either, don't get me wrong, Fm not saying that I won't except this offer and on the other hand Fm not
saying that I will, however if you'll let me think about it over night 111 call you tomorrow morning
with my answer". Since we had this conversation on Thursday and you hadn't got back in contact
with me as late as Monday I made an appointment to see a Contract Attorney on Tuesday.
After speaking with him, he told me the first thing that I should do is write you this letter before we
pursue legal action against Valley Spa. I have now sent you this letter by certified maiL If you do not
except my offer as described above we will settie this in court. My attorney told me that usually m
this type of case the court awards the original contract price + a set fee of 10% accumulative yearly
interest
If you do not except this offer and it goes to court, Fm suing for the return of the contract price +
interest (not any of Valley Spa products) Til take my money else where to make my purchase.
Mr. Brown you now have until November 20, 1999 to get back with me and totally resolve this
issue. If it is not resolved by this date, we will settie it in court
You can contact me by phone at 968-3738. If I am not at home you can leave a message, the
answering machine is always on.
Sincerely,
Larry Briggs
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84123 (801) 972-1215

6835 So. STATE STREET
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SALT LAKE CITY
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UTAH

•

84047(301)568-7050

November 11, 1999
Larry Briggs
4950 So. 4095 W.
Kearns, UT 84118
801-968-3788
Re:

Previous spa and gazebo purchase. Current in store creditof $8,939.19.

Dear Larry,
i s per your request I have ordered an Omni Luxury 12X16 green metal roof gazebo by Cal
>pa. This is the 1999 version of the product purchased on September 16, 1995. The agreed
ipon price is stated in my October 2 1 , 1999 letter to you, the Better Business Bureau, and
lie Utah Division of Consumer Protection.
a addition, Valley Spa has agreed to pay the balance of the contract by November 18,
999. Our agreement is as follows: $5995.00 plus tax of $380.60 totaling $6,375.68 will be
ibtracted from the current in store credit of $8,939.19. The balance of $2,563.51 will be
aid to you. If you are in agreement with this letter please acknowledge by signing below
here provided. Valley Spa will issue a check at the same time you provide us with
;reement of this letter.
lank you for your time and consideration of this proposal.
ncerely,

^
&4^
/'
(

well Brown

""-""*

yry
nature

Date
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Fax (801) 532-5178

THIRD DISTRIST COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Larry Briggs
Plantiff,
vs.
Valley Spas, Inc; Salt Lake Valley Spas,
Inc.; Lowell Brown; Valley Spa I, Inc
Respondent

} Affidavit of Larry Briggs
}
} Case no 990911916
}
}
}
} Judge Henriod
}
}
}

I Larry Briggs having been sworn under oath do testify according to my personal knowledge and belief the following:
1: If called to testify I would truthfully state the following;
2:1 bought a spa and gazebo from defendants because I thought they were manufacturers of these things.
3: Had I known that defendants were not manufactures of these products I never would have intrusted them with my money.
4:1 was told by employees of the defendant that I could retrieve my Cal Spas products anytime in the future.
5: In 19991 discovered thru a service man that works for defendants, that defendants no longer carried Cal Spa products.
6:1 was alarmed that defendants had not bothered to notify me of this
7: On or about September 1999 on two seperate occasions, I demanded that I be given a refund
8: However, I was refused a refund, once by a salesman, the next time by Lowell Brown
9. Lowell Brown told me that I had to spend my (store credit) on current merchandise on current prices, he also told me that
there would be no way that I could receive similar products that I had purchased in my contract because prices had gone up
and styles had changed. He also told me that I had to either accept a lesser gazebo or a lesser hot tub but he wasn't willing to
give me the similar sizes and styles acccording to my contract. At this point I felt coerced to settle with Lowell Brown on
terms that would be acceptable to him, or I would get nothing. I never bargained for a (store credit), I bargained for specific
goods.
10; I did not agree to this, so against my will I finally began to dicker with him.
11:1 was coerced into making an offer of settlement with Valley Spa.
12:1 wrote Lowell Brown a letter on or about November 1999, in it I demanded several things.
13:1 had demanded setup instructions for the gazebo, which he did not except.
14:1 did not agree to his new offer because I needed the setup instructions
15:1 specifically told Lowell Brown that I had to have my refund by November 20, 1999,1 still have not received any
refund from Loweu urown, ne also never ordered the gazebo I demanded.
16. On or about November 13th or 14th, I called Cal Spas to see if Lowell Brown had ordered a gazebo in my name.
17. They told me that they no longer or at any time in the future would do business with Lowell Brown or Valley Spas
18: On or about November 18th I called Lowell Brown, and he said to me that if he found out that I had contaced Cal Spas
that he would kill the deal and that I would have to take him to court and that it would cost me a whole lotta money.

19:1 never accepted Lowell Browns offer-proposal and signed it like he requested.
20: Lowell Brown told me that He thought the setup instructions were included in the crate, but this was not acceptable to
me.
21:1 would only accept an offer by Valley Spa if 1: either the setup instructions were included, or 2: Vally Spa agreed to
build the gazebo for me as my original contract stated, this was very important because building a deluxe 12' x 16' gazebo is
like adding an addition to ones home.
22:1 could not get Lowell Brown to specifically agree to one or the other.
23:1 understood from Lowell Browns tone of voice that he was sick of dealing with me and if the set up instructions were
not included that that would be my problem and not his.
24:1 waited until November 29th to see what Lowell Brown was going to do if anything.
25: The last conversation that I had had with Lowell Brown led me to believe that all dealings with him had been killed
because I had called Cal Spas.
26: Lowell Brown did not order the Cal Spa Omni Luxury gazebo as described in my contract.
27: Valley Spa was not ready to deliver any gazebo to me because they never called or contacted me to tell me they had it.
28: Valley Spa was not willing to deliver any gazebo to me because Lowell Brown told me that he would kill the deal if I had
contacted Cal Spas in any way, shape or form.
29: After that statement, I told him I had contacted Cal Spas.
30: We hung up and I understood that all negotiations or dealings were killed.
31:1 would never agree to buy anything new from an unauthorized dealer.
32: Had Lowell Brown told me that he was going to try to sell me a gazebo or hot tub that he had to secretly get thru
another dealer I would have never agreed to it.
33: Had I known that I had a right to a refund, I would not have negotiated with Lowell Brown, because what he was
willing to do for me was not acceptable to me, but he had me over a barrel and acting against my will under duress.
Dated this 17th day of March 2001.

U»*

Larry D. priggs

STATE OF TENNESSEE
COUNTY OF MONROE
Personally appeared before mef J o / ; q4(iV\//pr
, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State,
the within named LARRY D. BRJuGS, with whose identity was proven to me on the basis of satisfactory
evidence, and who acknowledgedtbat he executed the within instrument for the purposes therein contained.
Witness my hand and seal t h i s / ^ J a y of/^fr?/fr
,2001.
[
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Steven E. McCowin (#4621)
435 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 582-6529
Attorney for defendants and counterclaimants
Lowell Brown and Valley Spa I, Inc.
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION II
LARRY BRIGGS,
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL
BROWN; VALLEY SPA I, INC.
Defendants, and
Counterclaimants

]
)
]I
]
]
;
;)
;
)
]
]

AFFIDAVIT OF
LOWELL BROWN

Civil No. 990911916
Judge Henriod

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
I, Lowell Brown, being duly sworn and on my oath, state as follows:
1.

Except where indicated to the contrary, the information set forth herein is based

upon my personal knowledge, and if called to testify I would truthfully testify as follows:
2.

Although Valley Spa's dealership relationship with Cal Spas has been terminated,

Valley Spa continues to have a very limited business relationship with Cal Spas. For example, on
occasion Cal Spas will authorize Valley Spa to perform warranty work on Cal Spas' products. In
addition, on occasion Valley Spa is able to purchase partsfromCal Spas.
3.

No reasonable, objective person who visited Valley Spas' Utah State Fair exhibit

in 1993,1994, or 1995 could have come to the conclusion that Valley Spas was a manufacturer of
spas or gazebos.
4.

I maintain a close supervision over the salesmen employed by Valley Spa, and am

aware of the types of representations that they make on behalf of Valley Spa. No salesman of
Valley Spa would ever have told a customer that he or she could take delivery of purchased
goods at any point in the future.
5.

Prominently displayed at Valley Spa's Utah State Fair exhibit in 1993, 1994, and

1995 were signs stating that Valley Spa's prices were guaranteed for one year.
6.

Although Valley Spa is no longer a Cal Spas dealer, it has every right to sell Cal

Spas products which it has acquired.
7.

Pursuant to the parties' Settlement Agreement, defendants have already procured

for plaintiff the gazebo called for in his original contract with defendants. The particular model of
spa called for in the original contract between plaintiff and Valley Spa is no longer manufactured
by Cal Spas.
8.

I have never told plaintiff that his only right consisted of a "store credit" of

$8,939.19 that he could apply to Valley Spa's current products.
9.

Defendants have never exercised any duress over plaintiff or forced him to do

anything against his will.
10.

At the time Valley Spa entered into the original contract with plaintiff^ and for a

substantial period of time thereafter, Valley Spa had the spa and gazebo models specified in that
contract either in stock or available for prompt shipment. By waiting for four years before he
requested delivery the spa and gazebo, plaintiff substantiallyfrustratedValley Spa's performance
of that contract. During the four-years delay, Valley Spas had changed manufacturers; Valley Spa

can still obtain Cal Spa gazebos and spas, but Cal Spa no longer manufactures the particular
model of spa called for in the contract.
11.

Defendants have never attempted to persuade plaintiff to "repudiate" anything.

12.

Defendants never "killed" or in any other way repudiated the parties' Settlement

Agreement.
13.

Defendants are ready, willing, and able to perform all of their obligations under the

Settlement Agreement, subject to theirrightsof off-set in accordance with any damages awarded
to them on their counterclaim against plaintiff.
14.

Plaintiffs suggestion that the modest amount of money here as issue should be

maintained in any sort of separate trust account, escrow account, or interest-bearing account for
the benefit of plaintiff or that the money here at issue amounts to any significant '^working
capital," are silly and false. Such assertions bespeak a total unfamiliarity with commercial reality.
15.

Although the supplier through whom Valley Spa procured the gazebo called for in

the parties9 Settlement Agreement has asked that his name not be publicly disclosed, there is
nothing commercially unreasonable about this procurement process.

16.

After plaintiff paid off the purchase price under his contract with Valley Spa, a

number of things remained to be done under the contract First, plaintiff was required to notify
Valley Spa to request delivery, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing required that this
notice be given within a reasonable timeframe,and not delayed so long that Valley Spa's
performance would be frustrated
DATED this _ day of April, 200 L

^ j

L

o

^

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _ day of
My Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing at

U

B

r

o
f

v

2001.

^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL D
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LARRY BRIGGS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 990911916

Plaintiff,
vs.
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL BROWN,
VALLEY SPA I, INC.,
Defendants•

Plaintiff and defendants argued Motions for Summary Judgment
to the Court on May 22, 2001.

The Court took both Motions under

advisement at the conclusion of argument, and now issues this
Memorandum Decision.
On September 17, 1993, Larry Briggs signed a contract with
Valley Spas, Inc., to purchase a jetted hot tub and a Cal Spas Omni
Luxury Gazebo for $8,494.68. Plaintiff put $500 down.

Plaintiff

claims he informed defendants he could not accept delivery on the
tub and gazebo for several years, and that defendants replied it
would not be a problem for them to warehouse the goods.

On

September 16, 1994, plaintiff agreed to buy additional merchandise,
raising the total purchase to $8,939.19, and paid an additional
$939.19.
amount.

On September 16, 1995, plaintiff paid off the contract
Four years later, plaintiff attempted to take possession

BRIGGS V.
VALLEY SPAS

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of the merchandise that he had purchased, however, in the interim
period the defendants had stopped doing business with Cal Spas and
did not have the same gazebo or hot tub that plaintiff had
specified and this dispute ensued.
On September 26, 2 000, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
against defendants, claiming causes of action that include, but are
not limited to breach of contract, violations of state consumer
sales practices law, fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary
obligations.

Plaintiff demands damages in the amount of $70,000.

In response, the defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim,
arguing

that

because

plaintiff

is

engaged

in

anticipatory

repudiation of a settlement agreement and acted unreasonably in
violation of public policy, the Court should compensate defendants
for their attorney's fees.
Plaintiff's Motion is confusing, to say the least.

It is

difficult, if not impossible to determine which theories of
liability plaintiff relies upon.

For example, plaintiff alleges

duress, but does not clearly set forth any of the elements to prove
that cause of action.

Plaintiff's Motion is denied.

Defendants claim that plaintiff's November 9 letter was an
offer to settle this dispute on specific terms. Defendants contend
they accepted plaintiff's offer in their November 11 letter,

BRIGGS V.
VALLEY SPAS

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

accordingly asserting that a settlement agreement was created and
plaintiff is bound under the terms of that agreement.
The November 9 letter offered to settle the dispute and
totally resolve the issue, stating, (1) plaintiff is willing to pay
the current price of $5,995, plus applicable tax for the gazebo
described in the contract; (2) even though the original contract
included

delivery

and

set-up,

provided

defendant

includes

instructions, plaintiff will do assembly himself; (3) if you do not
accept this offer and it goes to court, I am suing for the return
of the contract price, plus interest.
On November 11, 1999, defendant responded to plaintiff's
offer, stating:
As per your request, I have ordered an Omni
Luxury 12 x 16 green metal roof gazebo by Cal
Spa. This is the 1999 version of the product
purchased on September 16, 1995.
Our
agreement is as follows: $5,995, plus tax of
$380.60, totaling $6,375.68, subtracted from
the current in store credit of $8,939.19. The
balance of $2,563.51 will be paid to you. If
you are in agreement with this letter, please
acknowledge by signing below where provided.
Plaintiff did not sign the agreement, and 13 days after the offer
to settle in the November 9 letter, he filed a Complaint.
In response to defendants1 Motion, plaintiff argues there was
no offer to settle the dispute, because plaintiff wrote the
November 11 letter under duress (although he fails to allege the

BRIGGS V,
VALLEY SPAS
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elements of duress); and two, that there was no offer, because
defendant informed him he was going to kill the deal because
plaintiff had contacted Cal Spa*

Plaintiff also raises the

sentence in the November 11 letter that says, "If you are in
agreement with this letter, please acknowledge by signing below
where provided,ff to argue that it wasnft a complete agreement until
he signed.
Plaintiff1s

November

9

letter

constitutes

an

offer.

Defendants1 November 11 letter is an unconditional acceptance of
plaintiff's offer. Plaintiff's claims of duress, deceptive layaway
plans and violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act do
not have merit.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Counsel

for defendants is to prepare a Judgment consistent with this
opinion.
Dated this l(

day of June, 2001.

STEPHEN L. H
DISTRICT COURT
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JUL 1 5 2003
SALT _ ^ a CO', NT]'
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LARRY BRIGGS,

Deouty Clerk

Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY

v.

CASE NO. 990911916

VALLEY SPAS INC.; SALT LAKE
VALLEY SPAS INC.' LOWELL
BROWN; VALLEY SPA I, INC.

JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD

Defendants

This matter is currently before the above entitled Court on
several pending motions, including: 1) Defendants1 Motion For Leave
To Amend Counterclaim; 2) Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment;
3) Defendants1 Motion To Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaim; 4)
Plaintiff's Motion To Revive Underlying Action; and 5) Defendants'
Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions.

Oral arguments were heard on July

22, 2 003 after which the Court took the matter under advisement.
Now, having considered the submissions of the parties along with
the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated herein.

I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND

Pursuant to the liberal amendment policies set forth in Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), the Court grants defendants' motion
for Leave To Amend tiheir Counterclaim to include the phrase: "and
by the wrongful manner in which plaintiff litigated."

rvf w-
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

On June 11, 2001 this Court issued a memorandum decision
granting defendants' original Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the claims
had

been previously

Agreement.

extinguished

by

the parties' Settlement

Now, defendants come before the Court requesting

summary judgment on their counterclaim for the legal expenses
incurred as a result of plaintiff's breach of the Settlement
Agreement.

In response, plaintiff asserts that his complaint was

meritorious and not brought in bad faith.
Consistent with its previous ruling, the Court concludes the
undisputed facts show that plaintiff knowingly and improperly
asserted

claims

which

he

had

previously

agreed

to

settle.

Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and in the
interests of justice, the Court rules that defendants may recover
the attorney fees incurred as a result of plaintiff's breach.
Accordingly,

defendants' Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

is

granted and plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss is denied.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVIVE UNDERLYING ACTION
\

Plaintiff moves the Court to revive the underlying action
claiming that even if there was a settlement agreement, which
plaintiff still maintains there was not, the settlement should be

MINUTE ENTRY
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considered void due to defendants alleged non-performance.
Essentially the same argument was made by plaintiff two years
ago with respect to defendants1 prior Motion for Summary Judgment.
Again, the Court confirms its earlier ruling and finds that
plaintiff breached the Settlement Agreement.

Furthermore, that

breach ultimately relieved defendants of any duty they had to
perform under the Agreement.

Consequently, plaintiff's Motion To

Revive The Underlying Claim is denied.

IV.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

Finally, defendants move the Court for an award of sanctions
against plaintiff's counsel, Greg Smith, in accordance with Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Specifically, defendants

allege that Mr. Smith violated

11 by

containing

knowingly

and/or

Rule

recklessly

false

filing pleadings
allegations

of

material fact. Mr. Smith denies defendants claims and argues that
Rule 11 is inapplicable.
Upon consideration of the parties1 arguments and Rule 11
itself, the Court declines defendants' invitation to invoke Rule 11
sanctions against Mr. Smith.

Defendants' motion for Rule 11

sanction is denied

Defendants' counsel is hereby requested to prepare an Order
consistent with this Minute Entry.

BRIGGS V VALLEY SPAS
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Dated this

2^?

day of July, 2003

BY THE COURT:

M<t<,
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
DISTRICT COURT
\

y

*»t rv

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this £0

Day of ^CL

2003:
Steven E. McCowin
435 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Affordable Legal Advocates
G. Brent Smith
180 South 300 West, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

++J

-
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Gregory B. Smith. #6657
Attorney for Plaintiff
180 South 300 West =170
Salt Lake City, UT 8-1101
Phone: (801)532-5100
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
Larry Briggs,
Plaintiff"

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINAL
JUDGMENT

vs.

Case no. 990911916

Valley Spas, Inc.. et al
Defendants

Judge Henriod

On July 25l 2003 the Court ruled by signed Minute Entry and instructed Defendants to prepare an
order "consistent with this Minute Entry." (Minute Entry of July 23rd 2003. at pg 3). On August 5lh
2003 \ Defendants served Plaintiff, by fax, their proposed Final Judgment. After discussion between
counsels, a second proposed Final Judgment ("Proposed Judgment") was served on Plaintiffs counsel
on August 11th 2003.
Plaintiff objects to the following language: u , as well as the grounds set forth in the defendants5
memoranda, plaintiffs claims are without merit and were not asserted in good faith." (Proposed
Judgment, at 2). Plaintiff suggests to the Court that the language "grounds set forth in defendants'
memoranda" seeks to incorporate all of Defendants' claims and arguments (not only those in their
motion for summary judgment) into the Court's conclusions. Plaintiff notes that this is not consistent
with the Court's Minute Entry where the Court has made its conclusion clear: "[T]he Court concludes
the undisputed facts show that plaintiff knowingly and improperly asserted claims which he had

1

The cover letter attached to the first proposal was dated July 28th 2003, Plaintiff assumes this is a typo.

previously agreed to settle." (Minute Entry of July 23r 2003. at 2). Plaintiff objects to this attempt to
circumvent the Court's ruling to suit Defendants* desires
Likewise, the language: "plaintiffs claims are without merit, and were not asserted in good faith."
The Court certainK knows of these terms and Plaintiff assumes that the Court chose its language
carefully and with full knowledge of what it was concluding. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants'
insertion of this \erbiage is an inappropriate attempt to bend the Court's ruling to their own purposes
and Plaintiff objects
Wherefore Plaintiff prays that the Court reject the proposed Final Judgment and instruct
Defendants to comph with its pre\ious ruling and prepare an ordei "consistent with this Minute
Entry." (Minute Entry of July 23rd 2003. at pg 3).
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Steven Edward McCowin, Hsq.
435 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801)582-6529
August 19.2003
Via Fax (801) 238-7076
The Honorable Judge Stephen L Henriod
Third District Court for the State of Utah
Re: Plaintiff*s Objection to Proposed Final Judgment
Dear Judge Henriod:
An award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-56 must include afindingof
fact that the party lacked good faith, and a conclusion of law that the action was without merit.
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 973 P,2d 932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998). To satisfy this requirement,
Defendants included the following language in the draft Final Judgment: "plaintiffs claims were
without merit, and were not asserted in good faith."
PlainlilTobjects to this language, PlaintilTinsists that the Final Judgment be limited to the
more abbreviated language of the Court's Minute Entry: ''plaintiff knowingly and improperly
asserted claims which he had previously agreed to settle." Defendants believe that the findings
required by Pennington are implicit in the Court's Minute lintry. Nevertheless, by objecting to the
specific language required by Penninuton, Plaintiff seems to be trying to create a technical legal
defect in the Final Judgment
Defendants also understand that there are multiple bases supporting the conclusion that
Plaintiff lacked good faith and asserted meritless claims - e.R„ Plaintiffs baseless assertions of a
$70,000 damages claim, and a personal claim against Defendant Lowell Brown. Defendants
therefore included the following language in the draft Final Judgment: "as well as the grounds set
forth in the defendants" memoranda."
Plaintiff also objects to this language. Again, Plaintiff attempts to limit the Final Judgment
to the specific language of the Minute Entry, insisting that there is but a single factual predicate
for the Court's judgment - that ^plaintiff knowingly and improperly asserted claims which he had
previously agreed to settle.7' Defendants respectfully submit that the Court should reject
Plaintiffs attempt to limit the Court's judgment to this single predicate,
Very truly yours.
-Stcven E. McCowin
cc:

Gregory B. Smith, Esq.
Via Fax (801) 532-5178
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Steven E. McCowin (#4621)
435 South 1200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 582-6529
Attorney for defendants and counterclaimants
Lowell Brown and Valley Spa I, Inc.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION II

LARRY BRIGGS,
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; SALT LAKE
VALLEY SPAS, INC.; LOWELL
BROWN; VALLEY SPA I, INC.
Defendants, and
Counterclaimants

]
)
]
]
]
;
)
)
]

FINAL JUDGMENT

Civil No. 990911916
Judge Henriod

The first motion of defendants Valley Spa L Inc., and Lowell Brown for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on for hearing on May
22, 2001, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Judge, presiding. In this first motion for summary
judgment, defendants asked the Court to dismiss the claims of plaintiff Larry Briggs on the basis
of the parties' prior Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff appeared through his attorney, Gregory B.
Smith; defendants appeared through their attorney, Steven E. McCowin. Having considered all
the evidence in support of and in opposition to the motion, and having heard and considered the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter;
The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that for the reasons
set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated June 11, 2001, the plaintiffs claims were

extinguished by the parties' settlement agreement.
:

: I h i ! -i »K!« ORDERED, ADJUDGED. 4-x-:r DECREED that the first motion of

defendants Valley ^

?

^ .1 1, : c. ane ,t is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED. AND DECREED that the uunphM>< -»i
H>laiiitill Larry Bn.;:,;.: ;x .n.vi u L,. dismissed with prejudice.
Fhe second motion ul dc!iM i.:::i *..- : • -

_w ;M- .:; :nc 1 uii

Rules of Civil Procedure came on for hearing on July 22, 2003, the Honorable Stephen L.
I lenrn id Judge,

|)R\SR)HI?J!

11 1 his second motion lor summary judgment, defendants asked the

Court for judgment on their counterclaim against plaintiff foi the legal expenses the> have
incurred as a result of plaintiffs breach of the parties' settlement agreement, and as a result of the
wront

<

;•.•:•/•

.H--..

riaintiff appeared through his attorney,

Gregory B. Smith; defendants appeared through their attorney, Steven I'. Me( \>wm I" hvmg
considered u.-; u;c evidence in support of and in opposition to the motion, and having heard and
considered the arguments ofVounsH ;md I»MII^ lull1, advised in (lie matter;
The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that 1 H th. u i^ons
set Infill in iln \ \nn i',, Minute Kntn tilled July 23, 2003, as well as the grounds set forth in the
defendants' memoranda, plaintiffs claims wei<j \\ith"«m 1 unit . 11 >• l \w MI mil asset led in ^ " d
faith. Defendants are therefore entitled to an award of their attorn
Codi1 Ann (S 7X-?7-S<i

fees pursuant to Utah

(|i,. 1 ,,,,,-, iiiiiflin imj., ||1;i| nH ||1C undisputed facts of this case, an award

of attorneys' fees is appropriate in the interests ofjustice. The euuif tin r hue exneises it\ v.|uil',
powers to award defendants the attorneys' fees they have incurred in this case. The.court further
finds that \h*ui;-e

•

* ;nj amount of $ ?U{Qb'l^

}

2

, and that

those fees were reasonable given the manner in which plaintiff litigated, ihe aunt tuftlia find
that nitset against these attorneys' fees is the $8,939 19 in cash and value that plaintiff was to
receive under the parties* settlnnnil aptniirnt,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED. AND DECREED thai defendants knv
_

(lulgint nt against pLuiifili I arr> ilnggs, lor attorneys' fees in the sum of$

((, jZy

together with interest from the date ol eiili v < tl llir^ nidtMiu'iil at the rate of
A
together with the costs and disbursements of this action amounting to %
In!

•> I"
9

% until paid
^_

, making a

al )l $ l f, l £ ' • j l in .ill. and liiiti defendants have execution therefore.
Larry Briggs resides at

security number is

. Mi Mn^'s snual
.

SUORDI'RID this ^ L da> ol t- y ^ t W

Judge Henriod

, 2(Hh

'

Approved as to^bnn

Appum d A\ in Unin

Ven E. McCowin ^ ~ ^ - - Attorney for Defendants

G. Brent Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. Procedure
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-27-56 Attorney's fees
--Award where action or defense in baa raith
Exceptions.

(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the a c
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).

(2) The o u r i , ;r. . • '• discretion, m.-r a u ^ \ \
under Subsection
> ut •,nl • ;; Uie couit

•

(a) finds the party has filed an af f idava t o\
before the court; or

ees against a party

inpecuniosity in the action

(
:
:
.
•
; the court enters in the nvdiij I h*» reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).

History: L. 1981, ch.

U.CA. 1953 §

I-

78-27-56, UT ST §

7ft V/ >.i,
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WEST'S Ul AH RULES OF COURT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VIL JUDGMENT
Copr © West Group 2003. All rights icserved
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RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favoi upon all or any part thereof
(b) Foi Defending Fart). A pdiiy against whom a < Linn, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, mine with oi without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion, it on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; i^urthet lestimon); Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented oi opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary
judgment if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith Should it appear to the satisfaction oi the court at any time that any oi the
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule aie presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
< opi
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forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

[Amended effective November 1 1997 ]
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11, CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
13-11-1 Citation of act.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Consumer Sales Practices
Act. "

History: T,. 1973, ,-h. 188, §

U. C. A. 1 9 5 3 §

i"!i !• 1 e• nt

1

13 -1 1 .1 , UT ST §
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
13-11-2 Construction and purposes of act.

This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:

(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales
practices;

(2) to protect consumers from suppl i *-'» '" w»m - "inn1 • ' - l»:.j< < j »t j ve
sales practices;

rind unconscionable

(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices;

(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with
the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act. relating to consumerprotection;

(si to make uniform the law, i ricluding the administra tive rules, with respect
l:o the subject; of this act among those states which enact similar laws; and

(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply with the
provisions of this act.

2.

'J.C.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
13-11-3 Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly or indirectly for
money, credit, property, financial assistance, or any other thing of value on
the plea or representation that it will be used for a charitable purpose. A
charitable solicitation may be made in any manner, including:

(a) any oral or written request, including a telephone request;

(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any handbill, written
advertisement, or publication;

(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or request of donations for any
book, card, chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise,
subscription, ticket, flower, flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, trinket,
tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in connection with which any
appeal is made for any charitable purpose, or where the name of any
charitable organization or movement is used or referred to as an inducement
or reason for making any purchase donation, or where, in connection with any
sale or donation, any statement is made that the whole or any part of the
proceeds of any sale or donation will go to or be donated to any charitable
purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete w h e n made, whether
or not the organization or person making the solicitation receives any
contribution or makes any sale.

(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or
other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods
, services, or other
property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance),
including the use or misuse of personal identifying information of any person
in relation to a consumer transaction to, or apparently to, a person for
primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes that relate
to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or
property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to
any of these transfers
or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as
defined in this section.

(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division of Consumer Protection.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that
determines the rights of the parties and concerning which appellate remedies
have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired.

(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,
cooperative, or any other legal entity.

(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, brok
er, or other
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions,
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.

History: L. 1973, ch. 188, §
57, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 §

3; 1983, ch. 58, §

13-11-3, UT ST §

4; 1987, ch. 105, §

2; 2000, ch.

13-11-3
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
13-11-4 Deceptive act or practice by supplier.

(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer
transaction violates thi s chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the
transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive
act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consu
mer transaction has sponsorship,
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it
has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if
it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the
fact ;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer tra
consumer for a reason that does not exist;

nsaction is available to the

(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in
accordance with a previous representation, if it has not;
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in
greater quantity than the supplier intends;
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the
supplier does not have;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a
warranty, a disclaimer of wa
rranties, particular warranty terms, or other
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false;
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other
benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for
giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the
supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit
is contingent on an event occurring after the consumer enters into the
transaction;

(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or
furnish the services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if
no specific time is advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or
furnish the services wi thin 30 days, unless within the applicable time period
the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either cancel the sales
agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the supplier or to
extend the shipping date to a specific date prop osed by the supplier, but any
refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer within ten business days after
the seller receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's right to
cancel the sales agreement and receive the refund;

(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct
solicitation sale within three business days of the time of purchase if the
sale is made other than at the supplier's established place of business
pursuant to the supplier's persona 1 contact, whether through mail, electronic
mail, facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct
solicitation and if the sale price exceeds $25, unless the supplier's
cancellation policy is communicated to the buyer and the policy offers gr eater
rights to the buyer than this Subsection (2)(m), which notice shall be a
conspicuous statement written in dark bold at least 12 point type, on the first
page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as follows: "YOU, THE BUYER,
MAY CANCEL THIS C ONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESS
DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation policy but not less
than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR RECEIPT OF THE
PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER.";

(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined
under Title 76, Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act;

(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable
solicitation will be donated or used for a particular purpose or will be
donated to or used by a particular organization, if the representation is
false;

(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle
repair against his motor vehicle insurance policy:

(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written
notice of:

(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the
repair, which dollar amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or
other copay arrangement in the consumer's insurance policy; or

(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar
amount a consumer was initially told he was responsible to pay a
s an
insurance deductible or other copay arrangement for a motor vehicle repair
under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount is less than the full amount
the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured t
o pay as a
deductible or other copay arrangement, unless:

(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the
repair, in which case, the full amount of the repair may be charged and
collected from the consumer; or

(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of
money the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible
or other copay arrangement, in which case, the supplier may charge and
collect from the consumer an amount tha t does not exceed the amount the
insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other
copay arrangement;

(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a
consumer transaction, or any addendum to any contract, r
eceipt, or other
written documentation of a consumer transaction, any confession of judgment or
any waiver of any of the rights to which a consumer is entitled under this
chapter; or

(r) charges a consumer for a
agreed to by the consumer.

consumer transaction that has not previously been

History: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 4; 1983, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 58, §
250, § 1; 1987, ch. 105, § 3; 1995, ch. 237, § 1; 1998, ch. 194, §
21, § 8; 2001, ch. 196, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 §

13-11-4, UT ST §

5; 1985, ch.
1; 1999, ch.

13-11-4
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16CFR
Commercial Practices
CHAPTER I
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
SUBCHAPTER D - TRADE REGULATION RULES

PART 429 - RULE CONCERNING COOLING-OFF PERIOD FOR SALES MADE AT HOMES
OR AT CERTAIN OTHER LOCATIONS
Sec.
429.0
429.1
429.2
429.3

Definitions.
The Rule.
Effect on State laws and municipal ordinances.
Exemptions.

Authority: Sections 1-23, FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 41-58.

§429.0 Definitions.
For the purposes of this part the following definitions shall apply:
(a) Door-to-Door Sale — A sale, lease, or rental of consumer goods or services with a purchase price of
$25 or more, whether under single or multiple contracts, in which the seller or his representative
personally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and
the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller
(e.g., sales at the buyer's residence or at facilities rented on a temporary or short-term basis, such as hotel
or motel rooms, convention centers, fairgrounds and restaurants, or sales at the buyer's workplace or in
dormitory lounges). The term door-to-door sale does not include a transaction:
(1) Made pursuant to prior negotiations in the course of a visit by the buyer to a retail business
establishment having a fixed permanent location where the goods are exhibited or the services are
offered for sale on a continuing basis; or
(2) In which the consumer is accorded the right of rescission by the provisions of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1635) or regulations issued pursuant thereto; or
(3) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and the goods or services are needed to meet a bona fide
immediate personal emergency of the buyer, and the buyer furnishes the seller with a separate dated and

signed personal statement in the buyer's handwriting describing the situation requiring immediate
remedy and expressly acknowledging and waiving the right to cancel the sale within 3 business days; or
(4) Conducted and consummated entirely by mail or telephone; and without any other contact between
the buyer and the seller or its representative prior to delivery of the goods or performance of the
services; or
(5) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and specifically requested the seller to visit the buyer's
home for the purpose of repairing or performing maintenance upon the buyer's personal property. If, in
the course of such a visit, the seller sells the buyer the right to receive additional services or goods other
than replacement parts necessarily used in performing the maintenance or in making the repairs, the sale
of those additional goods or services would not fall within this exclusion; or
(6) Pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance, or to the sale of securities or
commodities by a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
(b) Consumer Goods or Services -- Goods or services purchased, leased, or rented primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, including courses of instruction or training regardless of the
purpose for which they are taken.
(c) Seller ~ Any person, partnership, corporation, or association engaged in the door-to-door sale of
consumer goods or services.
(d) Place of Business — The main or permanent branch office or local address of a seller.
(e) Purchase Price - The total price paid or to be paid for the consumer goods or services, including all
interest and service charges.
(f) Business Day ~ Any calendar day except Sunday or any federal holiday (e.g., New Year's Day,
Presidents' Day, Martin Luther King's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day,
Columbus Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day.)
§429.1 The Rule.
In connection with any door-to-door sale, it constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice for any
seller to:
(a) Fail to furnish the buyer with a fully completed receipt or copy of any contract pertaining to such
sale at the time of its execution, which is in the same language, e.g., Spanish, as that principally used in
the oral sales presentation and which shows the date of the transaction and contains the name and
address of the seller, and in immediate proximity to the space reserved in the contract for the signature
of the buyer or on the front page of the receipt if a contract is not used and in bold face type of a
minimum size of 10 points, a statement in substantially the following form:

"You, the buyer, may cancel this transaction at any time prior to midnight of the third business day after the date of this
transaction. See the attached notice of cancellation form for an explanation of this right."

The seller may select the method of providing the buyer with the duplicate notice of cancellation form
set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, provided however, that in the event of cancellation the buyer
must be able to retain a complete copy of the contract or receipt. Furthermore, if both forms are not
attached to the contract or receipt, the seller is required to alter the last sentence in the statement above
to conform to the actual location of the forms.
(b) Fail to furnish each buyer, at the time the buyer signs the door-to-door sales contract or otherwise
agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in duplicate, captioned
either "NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL" or "NOTICE OF CANCELLATION," which shall (where
applicable) contain in ten point bold face type the following information and statements in the same
language, e.g., Spanish, as that used in the contract.
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION
[enter date of transaction]
(Date)
You may CANCEL this transaction, without any Penalty or Obligation, within THREE BUSINESS DAYS from the above
date.
If you cancel, any property traded in, any payments made by you under the contract or sale, and any negotiable instrument
executed by you will be returned within TEN BUSINESS DAYS following receipt by the seller of your cancellation notice,
and any security interest arising out of the transaction will be cancelled.
If you cancel, you must make available to the seller at your residence, in substantially as good condition as when received,
any goods delivered to you under this contract or sale, or you may, if you wish, comply with the instructions of the seller
regarding the return shipment of the goods at the seller's expense and risk.
If you do make the goods available to the seller and the seller does not pick them up within 20 days of the date of your Notice
of Cancellation, you may retain or dispose of the goods without any further obligation. If you fail to make the goods available
to the seller, or if you agree to return the goods to the seller and fail to do so, then you remain liable for performance of all
obligations under the contract.
To cancel this transaction, mail or deliver a signed and dated copy of this Cancellation Notice or any other written notice, or
send a telegram, to [Name of seller], at [address of seller's place of business] NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF [date],
I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION. (Date)

(Buyer's signature)

(c) Fail, before furnishing copies of the "Notice of Cancellation" to the buyer, to complete both copies
by entering the name of the seller, the address of the seller's place of business, the date of the

transaction, and the date, not earlier than the third business day following the date of the transaction, by
which the buyer may give notice of cancellation.
(d) Include in any door-to-door contract or receipt any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of
the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this section including specifically the buyer's right to
cancel the sale in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(e) Fail to inform each buyer orally, at the time the buyer signs the contract or purchases the goods or
services, of the buyer's right to cancel.
(f) Misrepresent in any manner the buyer's right to cancel.
(g) Fail or refuse to honor any valid notice of cancellation by a buyer and within 10 business days after
the receipt of such notice, to: (i) Refund all payments made under the contract or sale; (ii) return any
goods or property traded in, in substantially as good condition as when received by the seller; (iii) cancel
and return any negotiable instrument executed by the buyer in connection with the contract or sale and
take any action necessary or appropriate to terminate promptly any security interest created in the
transaction.
(h) Negotiate, transfer, sell, or assign any note or other evidence of indebtedness to a finance company
or other third party prior to midnight of the fifth business day following the day the contract was signed
or the goods or services were purchased.
(i) Fail, within 10 business days of receipt of the buyer's notice of cancellation, to notify the buyer
whether the seller intends to repossess or to abandon any shipped or delivered goods.
§429.2 Effect on State laws and municipal ordinances.
(a) The Commission is cognizant of the significant burden imposed upon door-to-door sellers by the
various and often inconsistent State laws that provide the buyer the right to cancel a door-to-door sales
transaction. However, it does not believe that this constitutes sufficient justification for preempting all of
the provisions of such laws and the ordinances of the political subdivisions of the various States. The
rulemaking record in this proceeding supports the view that the joint and coordinated efforts of both the
Commission and State and local officials are required to insure that consumers who have purchased
from a door-to-door seller something they do not want, do not need, or cannot afford, be accorded a
unilateral right to rescind, without penalty, their agreements to purchase those goods or services.
(b) This part will not be construed to annul, or exempt any seller from complying with, the laws of any
State or the ordinances of a political subdivision thereof that regulate door-to-door sales, except to the
extent that such laws or ordinances, if they permit door-to-door selling, are directly inconsistent with the
provisions of this part. Such laws or ordinances which do not accord the buyer, with respect to the
particular transaction, a right to cancel a door-to-door sale that is substantially the same or greater than
that provided in this part, which permit the imposition of any fee or penalty on the buyer for the exercise
of such right, or which do not provide for giving the buyer a notice of the right to cancel the transaction

in substantially the same form and manner provided for in this part, are among those which will be
considered directly inconsistent.
§429.3 Exemptions.
(a) The requirements of this part do not apply for sellers of automobiles, vans, trucks or other motor
vehicles sold at auctions, tent sales or other temporary places of business, provided that the seller is a
seller of vehicles with a permanent place of business.
(b) The requirements of this part do not apply for sellers of arts or crafts sold at fairs or similar places.

